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SEXISM, RACISM AND OPPRESSION. By Arthur Brit-
tan! and Mary Maynard.2 New York: Basil Blackwell. 1985. 
Pp. 236. Cloth, $29.95; paper, $10.95. 
Allan C. Hutchinson3 
If sexism and racism are the twin evils of contemporary Ameri-
can society, constitutional law must be judged by its ability to deal 
effectively with these persistent problems. To the accompaniment 
of much intellectual trumpeting and academic celebration, legal 
doctrine has developed various devices to combat racial and sexual 
oppression. Yet the efficacy of such doctrinal reforms remains at 
best questionable.4 For instance, although general standards of liv-
ing have improved, the wage and employment inequality between 
blacks and whites has worsened over the last thirty years; at 25%, 
unemployment among black high school graduates is the same as 
that for white high school drop outs; almost 50% of black children 
live in poverty; and 27% of Americans still believe that interracial 
marriage should be illegal. 
There are many complex reasons for the incapacity of the 
courts to deal effectively with sexism and racism. One of the con-
tributing causes is a general theoretical ignorance or, more perti-
nently, a failure to unearth and critically reevaluate the flawed 
assumptions that tacitly underpin legal thinking about racism and 
sexism. There has been a marked tendency to take a crude, one-
dimensional view of very complicated phenomena and to respond 
with correspondingly blunt legal proposals. As a partial antidote to 
this sociojurisprudential myopia, Arthur Brittan and Mary May-
nard offer a thorough critical analysis of the many extant theories 
about racism and sexism. Although the authors are English soci-
ologists and the main focus of the book is English society, there are 
sufficient arguments and general insights to warrant the book's rec-
ommendation to an American legal audience. 
The basic thrust of the book is that the available theoretical 
accounts of racism and sexism are unconvincing. The authors es-
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chew the worth of grand theories or holistic frameworks of oppres-
sion which claim universal validity. Highlighting serious lacunae in 
the traditional accounts, they reject any form of "theoretical reduc-
tionism" and maintain that oppression cannot be compressed into 
any simple formula. For them, oppression can only be understood 
in its particular historical and local context, by appreciating the op-
pressive minutiae and routines of everyday life: 
[The] terms of oppression are not only dictated by history, culture, and the sexual 
and social division of labour. They are also profoundly shaped at the site of oppres· 
sion, and by the way in which oppressors and oppressed continuously have to rene-
gotiate, reconstruct, and re-establish their relative positions in respect to benefits 
and power. In the final analysis 'oppression is where you find it,' and this is almost 
everywhere. 5 
The bulk of the book is devoted to criticizing the deterministic 
foundations of the major theoretical attempts to explain racial and 
sexual oppression. In the confined space of a book review, it is only 
possible to capture the briefest scent of the full and rich flavor of the 
authors' critique. They identify four main theories and condemn 
them all for squeezing racism and sexism into one reductive causa-
tive relation. These theories are biological essentialism, cultural de-
terminism, psychological reductionism, and Marxism. 
Over the last two decades, sociobiology has gained in intellec-
tual status and academic respectability. Like its cruder predecessor, 
Social Darwinism, it identifies certain supposedly "natural" and 
fundamental human traits which are considered to explain the inev-
itability of certain forms of behavior. For instance, male aggression 
and the urge to dominate can be traced to the hormonal constitu-
tion of men. Similarly, psychological reductionists attribute racism 
and sexism to the repressive and irrational operation of the human 
psyche; oppression and domination are seen as residual aspects of 
the interaction between instinct and repression. Brittan and May-
nard concede that biological and psychological factors contribute to 
the shaping of human behavior, but they categorically reject the 
ahistorical and simplistic causal claims made for these factors. As 
they pointedly note, "Human bodies live in history. They make his-
tory, and history repays the compliment by 'living' in the human 
body."6 
Cultural determinism posits that cultural history and its at-
tendant stereotypes are at the root of sexism and racism. The Eng-
lish are racist because of their colonial imperialist past and the 
Americans are racist because of their slave heritage. In short, West-
5. A. BRITfAN & M. MAYNARD, supra, at 7. 
6. /d. at 15. 
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ern culture is inherently and inescapably oppressive; people are 
scripted and socialized into racist and sexist roles. Maynard and 
Brittan reject such theories as they fail to explain why the particular 
forms of racism (white over black) and sexism (man over woman) 
have arisen. At best, cultural determinism provides only a partial 
account of oppressive practices and does not explain the more gen-
eral question of why Western culture is racist or sexist at all. 
Finally, Brittan and Maynard argue that Marxism in all its 
various shapes and sizes is flawed; as an analytical tool, it creates 
more difficulties than it solves. It tends to characterize the racially 
and sexually oppressed as indirect victims of a capitalist system, 
ideologically shaped and marginalized by economic forces. But, for 
Brittan and Maynard, the history of racism and sexism is too varied 
and complex to fit blacks and women into the general pattern of 
working class oppression. Indeed, racism and sexism are often most 
prevalent among the working class. Also, it is by no means clear 
that racism and sexism are functional for capitalism; they may actu-
ally inhibit economic development. 
Alternatively, some Marxist writers suggest that women and 
blacks constitute separate classes whose oppression is independent 
of economic divisions. For instance, in the case of women, the con-
trolling forces derive from the reproductive role and the domestic 
mode of production. Again, Brittan and Maynard reject this view 
as too tidy and reductionist. "Class" implies a homogeneity of in-
terests and experience, but oppression cuts across traditional cate-
gories as, for example, in the racist treatment of black women by 
white women and the abuse of white women by other white women. 
Accordingly, it is better to move beyond "class" to an analysis 
based on the possible interrelationship and divergence of racist, sex-
ist, and economic forms of oppression. 
Having found wanting the intellectual cogency of grand theo-
ries of oppression, Brittan and Maynard begin their own construc-
tive task by exploring the nature and techniques of oppression that 
arise in the family and the educational process. For them, both of 
these are the sites for learning sexist and racist attitudes, experienc-
ing the effects of oppressive relationships, and reproducing sexism 
and racism. An understanding of the familial and educational insti-
tutions provides ample evidence of the extent of oppression. For 
Brittan and Maynard, such racist and sexist practices can only be 
fully grasped by appreciating their localized and particularized op-
eration. For them, the search for a macrotheory of oppression must 
give way to the development of microstudies of racism and sexism: 
[A)II forms of oppression must be understood in social and historical terms. All 
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oppression is constructed for and by human beings .... The multi-dimensionality 
of oppression is, therefore, not a function of a supreme organizing principle, but is 
based on a similarity of oppressive practice and method.? 
Their microstudy of these oppressive routines of everyday life 
reveals to them that oppression always involves a degree of objectifi-
cation. Relying on the powerful insights of Catherine MacKinnon,s 
they conclude that the construction of "natural" categories still 
dominates much modern thinking: 
[W)hat men understand as a natural relationship between themselves and women 
disguises the actuality of their power. Objectification allows them to define them-
selves as a powerful and natural force operating on a world of things, as some kind 
of transcendental subjectivity moulding intractable nature into a desired form. The 
notion of masculinity as mastery over nature, as a heroic force struggling against 
the otherness of nature enables us to glean the essential component of the objectifi-
cation process. It also enables us to understand how the practice of domination 
over things is related to domination over people.9 
Nevertheless, Brittan and Maynard are at pains to suggest that 
this objectification process is neither total nor irresistible. They re-
fuse to succumb to determinism. They maintain that "the power of 
human intentionality" must be acknowledged. The oppressed are 
purposive and subjective agents whose experience and status must 
be taken into account: "All racist and sexist practice involves a 
power relationship in which the subjectivity of personal experience 
is intertwined with the objectivity of collective and political rela-
tionships." 10 Unfortunately, they are cryptic about the precise ex-
tent of human intentionality and, especially, on how we might bring 
about conditions in which it might fully exercise itself. Moreover, 
their guardedly optimistic conclusion reveals certain deep problems 
with their own theoretical assumptions about the operation of 
power and the possibility of a non-oppressive social structure. 1 I 
In their account of oppression, Brittan and Maynard identify 
power as the medium through which some oppress others. Oppres-
sion is equated with the exercise of power and is synonymous with 
exploitation. Along with many theorists, therefore, they view 
power as a type of negotiable currency that can be grafted onto ex-
isting relationships. Consequently, they imagine that power can be 
eliminated or at least neutralized. Yet, like so many "radical" theo-
7. !d. at 21S-16. 
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10. !d. at 213. 
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rists, 12 they fail to recognize that power is also fundamentally pro-
ductive. Indeed, society consists of a network of power relations. 
The whole notion of people as individuals and as intentional agents 
is itself a product of the modern historical era. People long thought 
of themselves as putty in the hands of historical fate. 13 Accord-
ingly, outside of a historically situated scheme of social relations, 
individual intentionality is not cognizable as such. 
What contribution can all of this admittedly abstract theo-
rizing make to the development of constitutional doctrine? What 
do Brittan and Maynard have to say to the constitutional lawyer as 
opposed to the theorist? Part of the answer is that nothing is so 
practical as a good theory, especially when that theory recommends 
very practical and concrete study. Yet, more specifically, there is a 
very positive contribution that can be made to the critique and re-
working of constitutional doctrine. Many judicial decisions, like 
Michael M v. Superior Courf,14 Dothard v. Rawlinson,1s and Harris 
v. McRae, 16 rely on very dubious categories of "the natural" to give 
their reasoning any semblance of coherence or accountability. As 
Tribe has pointed out, the courts view the law as being a mirror of 
nature. Although less overt than it used to be, "by automatically 
translating biology into social destiny" 17 the courts deny women 
and blacks full control over their own bodies and equal command 
over their own futures. 
Lawyers must be assiduous in rooting out the oppressive attri-
bution of certain characteristics to particular groups of individuals 
as "natural." People differ in all kinds of different ways other than 
their skin color and sexual organs: there are tall and short, fat and 
thin, blue-eyed and green-eyed, blonde-haired and brown-haired, 
and curly-haired and straight-haired people, to mention but a few 
distinctions. None of these traits should be unthinkingly assumed 
to have any intrinsic significance. The ambition must be not to 
achieve a racially and sexually integrated and mixed society, but to 
strive for a society that abandons entirely "race" or "gender" as 
socially significant-a truly raceless and genderless society. Blacks 
and whites, women and men are not created, but constructed. 
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